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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MONEY MARKET cannot meaningfully be
viewed from a narrow, technical standpoint. Instead, they should be
seen against the backdrop of basic economic conditions. Let us,
therefore, begin the analysis of the second period-mid-1952 to
mid-1953-by having a look at a few of the more important eco-
nomic indicators.
In general, the period may be characterized as one of continued
expansion of economic activities without commodity price inflation.
Mr. Koch has detailed the expansion that began in early 1950 and
carried through to mid-1952. The next period was in essence more
of the same with culmination at the peak level of all time in mid-
1953. Some evidences of impending recession appeared during the
second quarter of 1953.
More concretely, between mid-year 1952 and mid-year 1953, gross
national product rose from $345 billion to $372 billion (annual
rates), or by 8 per cent. All components of GNP contributed to the
expansion-personal consumption, private investment, and govern-
ment purchases. The most active contribution was made in the form
of additions to business inventories, thus setting the stage for the
recession to follow. Other measures of the expansion are the 15 per
cent rise of industrial production and the 11 per cent rise in manu-
facturing employment (Federal Reserve indexes). The value of the
dollar remained almost constant. A rise of about 2 per cent in con-
sumers prices was offset by a small decline in wholesale prices.
As one would expect, the expansion of GNP was financed by an
increase in the main monetary and banking series. Total loans and
investments of all commercial banks rose about 3 per cent which
created a similar increase in the money supply (currency and de-
mand deposits). In addition, money was spent somewhat more ac-
tively, as evidenced by an increase of 3.5 per cent in the turnover
of demand deposits.
Analysis of the money market likewise discloses a continuation
of tendencies that had their origins in the preceding period dis-
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cussed by Mr. Koch. The outstanding feature was one of the
sharpest increases in money rates on record, the bulk of which took
place between October, 1952, and June, 1953. Treasury bill rates
rose from 1.7 per cent to 2.4 per cent; open market commercial
paper rates from 2.31 per cent to 2.75 per cent; U.S. long-term
bond yields from 2.74 per cent to 3.09 per cent; and Moody's AAA
bonds from 3.01 per cent to 3.4 per cent. Of course, this meant a
disturbing break in bond prices which gave rise to the quip that the
United States Treasury 21's of 1972-67 would break 90 before Ike
could do so. I do not know whether Ike won or lost this battle, but
the 21's did drop below 90 in June, 1953. As you are well aware,
they have since recovered to about par.
Now wherein lies the explanation of this sharp rise in money rates?
A superficial answer can be given in terms of the net reserve position
of the member (commercial) banks which is defined as the differ-
ence between excess legal reserves and borrowings at the Federal
Reserve Banks. Statistical studies have established a close inverse
correlation between the net reserve position of the banks and the
level of money rates. That is, when it is necessary for the banks to
borrow increasing amounts from the Reserve Banks to meet legal
reserve requirements, rates usually move upward. This situation
reflects the ascendancy of demand factors over supply factors in the
credit market, combined with reluctance of the banks to be in debt
to the Federal Reserve. Moreover, this attitude of reluctance may
be re-enforced by a rise in the Federal Reserve discount rate. On the
other hand, when excess legal reserves are piling up in the hands of
member (commercial) banks, rates usually move downward. Sup-
ply factors are in the ascendancy. Banks bid down yields on second-
ary reserve assets and offer loan money more freely at lower rates
in an effort to increase income.
For nearly two decades prior to mid-1952 excess reserves sub-
stantially exceeded borrowings at the Federal Reserve, that is, a
net reserve surplus existed. This meant that the supply of loan
money was readily available at lowrates. But beginning at mid-year
1952 an almost forgotten phenomenon appeared once again in the
form of "net borrowed reserves." Borrowingsat the Federal Reserve
rose sharply and fluctuated between $1 billion and $1.5 billion until
late May, 1953. Net borrowed reserves ranged between $400 million
and $1 billion.
The amount of net borrowed reserves, however, constitutes only
a partial measure of the diminished liquidity of commercial banks.
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Their secondary reserve position must also be included if the view
is to be complete. The record reveals that commercial banks in-
cluded in the Treasury's monthly survey held $6.7 billion less U.S.
securities with maturities under five years and $3.1 billion less ma-
turing within one year on May 31, 1953, than on June 30, 1952.
Between the same dates their holdings of U.S. securities with ma-
turities of fiveyears and over increased $3.8 billion. In addition, the
market prices of their enlarged holdings of intermediate and long-
terms declined well below par, and below cost in most cases. Thus,
bank loans could be increased only by borrowing more reserves,
by further reduction of short-terms, or by selling securities at a loss.
A marked deterioration in bank liquidity had indeed taken place.
The Federal Reserve discount rate was raised from I! per cent to
2 per cent in January, 1953.This, together with the diminished bank
liquidity just cited, was concrete evidence of an active, rather than
a passive, role by the Federal Reserve in regulating the money mar-
ket. They feared overexpansion and inflation of commodity prices
during this period, and therefore approved conditions that resulted
in rising interest rates.
This brings us to the deeper question: What underlying factors
were responsible for the "net borrowed reserve" position of the mem-
ber (commercial) banks during this period? In view of the em-
phasis usually placed on the restrictive policies of the Federal Re-
serve, it may surprise some of you that the positive forces behind
member bank borrowing originated in the free market, and that the
Federal Reserve used its powers mainly to soften the effects of
these market developments. In fact, money rates would have been
much higher had the Federal Reserve banks not purchased a sub-
stantial amount of United States securities-about $1.3 billion be-
tween mid-year 1952 and May, 1953. This partially offset a decline
of the gold stock of $0.8 billion and an increase of currency in cir-
culation of $1 billion.
Another strong influence contributing to higher rates was the in-
tensity of demand for loanable funds by business corporations, in-
dividuals, and governmental units. During the first half of 1953 they
raised about $11 billion net of retirements-$1.5 billion more than
in the first half of 1952. Commercial bank loans rose by nearly $6
billion between mid-year 1952 and mid-year 1953. The flow of cur-
rent saving was large, but still not sufficient to meet the heavy de-
mand for funds.
Moreover, the investment market was confronted with great un-
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certainties, especially during the second quarter of 1953. It ap-
peared likely that the Treasury would have to raise between $9 and
$12 billion of new money during the second half on top of a heavy
private, state, and local demand. This was against the background
of repeated Federal Reserve and Treasury statements with regard to
the new era of a free market for government securities, the intention
to lengthen maturities and to follow sound money policies. The
Treasury had issued the 30-year 31's on May 1 in line with its well-
heralded program of extending maturities. Would more long-terms
be offered in the near future in competition with private demands?
Also, would the Reserve authorities release reserves to commercial
banks to finance both Treasury needs and the seasonal expansion
of loans and currency during the second half? These uncertainties
prompted some borrowing in anticipation of still higher rates to
come, thereby magnifying the upward pressure on rates.
In summary, the period from mid-1952 to mid-1953 may be char-
acterized as one of intense prosperity without commodity price in-
flation, accompanied by sharply rising interest rates. The higher
rates grew out of large demands for credit over against a restricted
supply of loanable funds in the hands of commercial banks. The re-
stricted supply in turn arose from a substantial increase in currency
in circulation combined with a reduction in the gold stock. Con-
fronted with these conditions and fearing overexpansion, Federal
Reserve authorities held the reins on credit supply taut by releasing
more reserve money sparingly, with the result that the liquidity of
commercial banks was materially reduced.
